Front. Lit. Stud. China 2021, 15(1): 4–31
DOI 10.3868/s010-010-021-0002-1

RESEARCH ARTICLE

SUZUKI Masahisa

How to Create "Asianism": A Reading of Takeuchi Yoshimi's "Asia as Method" and "Prospects for Asianism"*

Abstract Takeuchi Yoshimi is one of the very few postwar Japanese intellectuals to openly engage in discussions on Asia intricacy and to deal with the most complicated component of the Japan–Asia relationship: problems of emotion. One key feature of Takeuchi's approach lies in the fact that he is not only a profound thinker but also a sensitive litterateur. For this reason, in addition to the fact that it is already very difficult to form an objective and widely agreed view on Takeuchi and his approach, it is hard to avoid the emotional aspect when evaluating his thoughts. This essay does not aim to discuss his rights and wrongs; rather, it is an attempt to analyze the inner logic of Takeuchi's thoughts, to understand and grasp the intensity and structure of his thoughts and emotions, and to demonstrate where his sense of urgency lies, thereby allowing to view the examination of the diverse and complex nature of discourses on Asianism in Japan in a new light.

Keywords Takeuchi Yoshimi, Asianism, "Asia as Method," "prospect for Asianism"

Japan and Asia

The vision that the twenty-first century is an Asian century has almost

* Translated by QING Xin, The University of Tokyo.

SUZUKI Masahisa (✉)
Graduated School of Humanities and Society, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, 186-8601, Japan
E-mail: m.suzuki@r.hit-u.ac.jp

come true. Ever since the collapse of the once dominating Cold War bipolarity, by the latter half of the twentieth century came a multi-polar world, in which the rise of China has brought forth new hopes and prospects. It is now impossible to tackle global problems without looking into the issues concerning Asia and hence facing the intricacy within it. Unlike the economically interdependent Europe, which also has a highly integrated political union (the European Union), Asia is still torn in many aspects: economic partnership aside, peaceful and constructive political relationships are still lacking among the geographically proximate Asian countries, while poignant hostilities soar at times. As Asia is playing an increasingly important role in the international economic and political arena, it has also become an increasingly complicated subject, on which holistic discourses are difficult to make. Yet, in the face of such vexation, one could look back on history and on the many historical attempts to approach "Asia," thereby finding cues for the contemporaries.

Undoubtedly, the leading figure examining "Asianism" throughout Japanese intellectual history is Takeuchi Yoshimi, who encouraged most of the scholarly discourses on Asianism in Japan. Intriguingly, however, opinions on Takeuchi are often polarized, despite consensus on the significance of his contribution to the field. While some speak highly of him as a pioneer in breaking away from West-centrism and developing ideas uniquely based in Asia, others criticize that what he did is in fact sugarcoating jingoism and the colonial history of Japan. Underlying the divided critiques is a tough question for all postwar Japanese intellectuals. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, Japan atrociously invaded many Asian countries and regions. Consequently, after Japan's defeat in 1945, the starting point as well as the aim for many Japanese intellectuals was to reflect deeply on Japan's wartime atrocity, and such reflections were indeed of great value for scholars of the following generations. The problem is, however, that the focus on Japan's invasion of Asia has made discourses on Japan's relation with Asia an intractable "taboo." If approaching this issue from a historical perspective, one might be accused of shying away from Japan's historical responsibilities; if engaging in discussions on the contemporary and realistic relations between the two, one would still be suspected of promoting economic

neocolonialism. As a result, most Japanese intellectuals have more or less avoided addressing this "Asia intricacy." Nevertheless, in reality, Japan is inseparable from Asia. Indeed, some postwar Japanese scholars have resumed the examination of Japan's connection with Asia, their rationale being that Japan could not fulfill its duty unless the Asia intricacy was resolved. That is to say, while postwar Japanese intellectuals skirted around issues with Asia on the surface level due to the impossibility of engaging the topic in a politically correct sense, deep within, some of them have always been craving for a more thorough examination of Asia.

Takeuchi Yoshimi is one of the very few postwar Japanese intellectuals to openly engage in discussions on Asia intricacy and to deal with the most complicated component of the Japan–Asia relationship: the problems of emotion. One key feature of Takeuchi's approach lies in the fact that he is not only a profound thinker but also a sensitive litterateur. Therefore, in addition to the fact that it is already very difficult to form an objective and widely agreed view on Takeuchi and his approach, it is hard to avoid the emotional aspect when evaluating his thoughts. Nevertheless, this article does not aim to discuss his rights and wrongs; rather, it makes an attempt to analyze the inner logic of Takeuchi's thoughts, to grasp and understand the intensity and structure of his thoughts and emotions and demonstrate where his sense of urgency lies, thereby allowing to view the examination of the diverse and complex nature of discourses on Asianism in Japan in a new light.

"Asia as Method"

In 1960, Takeuchi delivered a speech at the Committee on Asian Studies (later the "Institute of Asian Cultural Studies") of the International Christian University, during which he introduced his studies of Sinology and the analytic framework for Asian thoughts. The content of the speech was later transcribed into an essay titled "Asia as Method."

The essay sheds light on what had brought Takeuchi to the field of sinology. Takeuchi visited China for the first time during his sophomore year at college. Staying in Beijing, seeing how people lived, and feeling a sense of intimacy, Takeuchi wrote:

> Seeing how people there strive for their everyday life with my own eyes, what I regret the most is the language barrier that prevented us from understanding each other. There were Chinese courses at the university, but they were far from practical. While it was my fault to have skipped those lessons, they were indeed of trivial use. Underlying the failure of understanding is the key to the solution of my problem and, in a deeper sense, the problem of literature. Before this, I have encountered what is called modern literature already—or to say, I have established my approach to literature through reading modern Japanese literature. Here, however, lies something worth scrutinization and awaiting solutions. In our neighboring country many people live just like us; we could not look into their mind, nevertheless, and that is a detrimental problem.[1]

According to records, Takeuchi arrived in Beiping (now Beijing) in 1932. With funding from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the student group of which Takeuchi was a member left Japan on August 7, 1932, traveled in many regions of China, and disbanded in Dalian on August 22. After the trip, Takeuchi stayed in Beiping alone for another one month or so.[2] It must be noted that 1932 was just one year after the September 18th Incident, and tension between China and Japan was rising. In his diary, Takeuchi had also written down the suffocating intensity that he felt when walking in the streets.[3] However, his speech did not address such a political aspect, and what he emphasized throughout was his wish to walk into the inner life of the Chinese public.

This excerpt of his memoir reveals Takeuchi's characteristics. First, he was eager to learn about the inner life of the Chinese. He did not ignore the tension between the two countries by any means; on the contrary, he paid close attention to the state of war and uncertainty. Apart from the diaries, at almost the same time as the "Asia as Method" speech was

---

[1] Takeuchi Yoshimi, "Hoho to shite no Ajia" 方法としてのアジア, 93.

[2] See the "Chronicle" made by Kume Sakao 久米旺生, in *Takeuchi Yoshimi zenshū*, 290.

[3] Takeuchi wrote in his diary that "Situations (in Beiping) appears to be less tense than in Manchuria, but ever since Zhang Xueliang 張學良 stepped down, there has been much uncertainty." Takeuchi Yoshimi, "Yuhei nikki" 游平日記, in *Takeuchi Yoshimi zenshū*, vol. 15, 12.

delivered, Takeuchi openly advocated for normalization of the Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations with the argument that war does not end unless normalization is realized. These facts suggest that the lack of discussion on the political dynamics of 1932 in Takeuchi's 1960 speech does not point to his distanced stance on politics; rather, it illustrates that Takeuchi would rather prioritize his inquiries into the life of Chinese people, however turbulent the political sphere was at that time. His choice could even be interpreted as "in order to approach the political intricacy, he first sought to examine the inner life of the Chinese." Second, "to look into the inner life of the Chinese" was not just to understand the Chinese as an "other" but also to understand his own problems. In other words, understanding China was not to depict a foreign country in a detached and distanced stance; rather, it was through learning about China, the neighbor with both proximity and unpredictability, that Takeuchi explored and solved his own problems. Integral to Takeuchi's thinking is this inseparability between understanding China and solving his own problems. This unique take on the relation between self and other is rather intriguing.

To investigate the inner life of Chinese people, Takeuchi turned to literature. In another piece of diary recollecting his stay in Beiping, Takeuchi wrote:

> My wish is to capture the spirits of Chinese people . . . . I do find strings of harmony existing between us, but this melody is hard to grasp. I am sure that it could only be approached through literature.[4]

It is easy to acknowledge that Takeuchi's view on literature is rather unique. What he called "literature" did not comprise written works on which litterateurs projected their own thinking, but it rather hinted at luring readers into the mind of the other and also encouraged them to reflect on themselves. That is to say, Takeuchi's literature is not literature in a narrow sense but a field that drives individual readers into the intricate relation between the self and the other. In conclusion, in his 1960

[4] Takeuchi Yoshimi, "Son bun kan no mondaiten" 孫文観の問題点, in *Takeuchi Yoshimi zenshū*, vol. 5, 26. Originally published in 1957.

speech, Takeuchi recalled that his experience under the extreme political tension in Beijing in 1932 led to his discovery of the Chinese as the other, while the urge to dig into the depth of Chinese people's inner life and to explore the interrelated field encompassing oneself and the other is the determining driving force for his thorough study on Chinese literature.

Throughout his life, Takeuchi's activities have more or less developed along this string of logic. His work *Lu Xun* (1944), published during the war, embodied exactly such way of thinking. The work that came after Japan's defeat, "What Is Modernity" (1945), went one step further, analyzing China's distinct experience of modernity, which is different from that of Japan, and also proposing the "Takeuchi approach" to tackle the conundrum of Japanese modernity.

The reason behind constructing such a framework in "What Is Modernity" and establishing the core constituents for the examination of Asian modernity is also elaborated in "Asia as Method." In the face of the consequences of Japan's defeat in the invasive war, Takeuchi started by exploring the roots from where modern Japanese history went astray—to reflect thoroughly on Japan's history since the modern period. He wrote:

> To be specific, I have proposed a hypothesis after the war—there should be more than two "modes" of modernization process for the later developed countries. The Meiji Restoration of Japan did bring a new light to many and inspire the emancipation of the backward, colonized countries in the East. Had it gone smoothly, the Japan mode would have become the only exemplar. But reality said otherwise—it sank in failure. Looking in retrospect, I think the Japanese experience does represent one mode, but not the only mode for Eastern countries or other later developing countries to modernize themselves. There are other possibilities, other paths ahead. If we compare the instance of Japan with that of China, we find how different in essence the two are. I assume Japan and China as two typical modes for comparison here because I have relatively little knowledge of cases in other countries. But if I have to say so, countries like Turkey might have shared similar experiences with

> Japan, while India resembles China more. Anyway, I think there are more than two patterns.[5]

Takeuchi began with reflections on the war and proposed two different modes for modernization—that of China and that of Japan. Apparently, Takeuchi's approach here is to examine Japan's present and future by reflecting on Japan's historical problems. It is worth noting that, even though Takeuchi sought to solve Japan's problems by examining China's modernization, he did not generalize China as Japan's counterpart. Critiques often point out that Takeuchi somehow romanticized the image of China in an attempt to criticize Japan, which was rather misleading. This kind of comment, at least from Takeuchi's own intention, does not hold water because what Takeuchi touched upon was the essential difference between Japan's and China's modernization patterns. He investigated the nature of China's modernization process to advance the theory of two different modes of modernization rather than coining an imaginary modern China for the sake of critique. Takeuchi was firm in the belief that China is an "other" that is not arbitrarily constructed by the Japanese and that the problems that lie within himself could be addressed by approaching China as the other.

On the nature of China's modernization, Takeuchi referred to John Dewey's and Bertrand Russell's observations of Japan and China during the May Fourth period. Dewey travelled to Japan in 1919 and later to China, witnessing the May Fourth Movement in China with his own eyes. In the 1920s, Dewey had many publications comparing the modernization processes in Japan and China, and he spoke highly of the patriotic movements led by Chinese youths—especially of their new spirits. In contrast, he observed that their Japanese counterparts, while appearing to be progressive, lacked the resolution to carry the destiny of their nation on their shoulders. Inspired by and citing Dewey's analysis, Takeuchi wrote: "Progressive and advanced as Japan appears to be, there is fragility lying deep within, which has put Japan on the brink of breaking down," while "China's modernization is spontaneous, i.e., the urge to

[5] Takeuchi, "Hoho to shite no Ajia," 96.

modernize itself has been firm and stemmed from its needs."[6] This "spontaneous" aspect of Chinese modernity is what Takeuchi has emphasized, scrutinizing Dewey's arguments and formulating his own comparison of a spontaneous modernization process in China and of a shallow Japanese modernization that embraced Western culture only superficially.

Takeuchi valued the spontaneity of history and discovered that in the modern history of China. As discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, Takeuchi wanted to investigate the everyday life of Chinese people; for him, it is possible to understand the issue of spontaneity of modernization on a national level only through a glimpse of the inner life of the common people. Postwar Japanese intellectuals tended to sever the common lives of the individuals from the actions of the state. Such an attempt sought to amend the failure of prewar Japan, in which rampant nationalism overwhelmed the individual lives within; in order to secure the space for the common people, these intellectuals intentionally separated the sphere of individuals from that of the state. Certainly, Takeuchi did not conform to this approach, and he did not see the relation between individual lives and state actions as separate or even opposite. Of course, Takeuchi by no means suggested that the state ought to control the lives of its citizens; rather, according to him, it is exactly the ideas rooted in the everyday life of the commoners that direct a nation's historical progress. Takeuchi sought to inquire into and get as close as possible to the inner world of the Chinese public and, by doing so, extract thoughts that ought to lead the way of the whole nation. In his understanding, the modernization process in Japan lacked such firm roots in the everyday life of its people and hence has only emulated Western modernity. In contrast, Chinese modernization has a solid base in the lives and experiences of its people and therefore undergoes spontaneous modernization.

From today's historical studies, whether Chinese people did possess such determining spontaneity to bring forth modernization in China of course requires reexamination. However, as pointed out in the foregoing sections, the goal of this essay is not to assess the "rights" and "wrongs"

[6] Ibid., 100.

of Takeuchi's arguments but to reiterate his inner logic. His high remarks on the will and power of the Chinese people undoubtedly had their historical context. China established its "People's Republic" in 1949 and upheld the ideal of "people own the new China." From Takeuchi's perspective, in a strict sense, the revolutions in China would not have succeeded without the power and will of its people. Some have criticized Takeuchi's overrating of Mao Zedong 毛澤東 (1893–1976). Nevertheless, this overestimation of Mao's achievement was still based on his belief that Mao represented the will of Chinese people—in essence, what he really cared about was the power of the common Chinese people under the new China. Therefore, we could also conclude that the "China" into which Takeuchi inquires is in fact the life of Chinese people, and this "life" extends from minuscular details of everyday life to the macroscopic progress of national history. Only by this, maintained Takeuchi, can one see through the very essence of China. Moreover, through inquiries of everyday life in China, one could witness the everyday life of Japanese people and hence solve the historical problems of Japan.

This essay, titled "Asia as Method," pinpoints the originality in Takeuchi's thoughts and attitudes. The expression "as method" here is rather attractive, and many scholars have resumed the use of such a phrase and given their own interpretations of Takeuchi's intention. Through it, some argued, Takeuchi opposed the concept of a concrete, physical Asia. For instance, Japanese intellectual Koyasu Nobukuni 子安宣邦 wrote:

> When Takeuchi wrote down this phrase, he was still able to see the effort of constructing the third world by Asian nationalism. It was a pioneer, independent movement throughout Asia that rests on both negation and creation. Now we no longer see such nationalism in Asia. Nationalism nowadays has sprouted from the global crises which countries confront in the 21st century, from the losses of social homogeneity, and from the cleavages among the populations in a country; it only gives a false and transient sense of unity and is in nature a self-deceptive movement. The resurgence of nationalism no longer gives birth to a new "Asia." But we shall not confuse: The

> rebirth of Asia is never our ends; if it is, then what it begets is only an illusionary "Asian community." "Asia as Method" means we should resist such illusionary Asian modernity with negation.[7]

Koyasu firmly criticized nationalism and reviewed Takeuchi's thoughts under such apparatus, underlining that "Asia as Method" never suggests an "Asian community" besides its value in intellectual history. This interpretation does make sense. As mentioned, postwar Japanese intellectuals saw the necessity to break away from the imperialist prewar Japan under the agenda of "Greater Asia" and have, therefore, emphasized that no more discussions shall point toward the unification of Asia in a physical sense. Takeuchi upheld such a principle.

On the other hand, while avoiding the old trap of a concrete Asia, Takeuchi proposed, at the end of his essay, that "'as method' is the process through which a 'subject' is born."[8] This line illustrates that Takeuchi valued not only the "means" as opposed to physical implications but also the process that gives birth to the subject. That is to say, he anticipated Japanese people to become the real driving force of Japan's modernization and to become the vital soul and core of such a process. Though he acknowledged that it is only his prospect for the future, Takeuchi spared no efforts in mobilizing civic movements among the Japanese public. The phrase "as method" reveals precisely such anticipation and resolution.

The "Anpo Movement"

Between January and February 1960, i.e., between the speech of "Asia as Method" and the publication of the essay under the same name, the Anpo Protests happened in Japan. With the renewal of the Security Treaty between the US and Japan—the content of which became more complicated and would further strengthen the military ties between the two—Japan was more deeply tangled into the American camp under the Cold War bipolarity, which further increased its risk of being dragged into

[7] Koyasu Nobukuni, *Kindai no chokoku to a nanika* 「近代の超克」とは何か, 253.
[8] Takeuchi, "Hoho to shite no Ajia," 115.

wars again. Opposing this move, mass protests organized by the Japanese public were also taking place, of which Takeuchi was among the major opinion leaders and active participants. When Japanese Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke 岸信介 forcefully passed the bill, Takeuchi resigned from his position as professor to show his disagreement and started publishing as an independent critic.

When commenting on the incident, usually known as the "Anpo Protests," it is noteworthy that Takeuchi referred to it as the "Anpo Movement" instead. In one gathering, he even called it a "national movement." He commented,

> We could examine this movement between May and June from different perspectives. In terms of the form of the movement, it is fine to call it a "national movement." There have been some other cases called "national movement," but they were in fact not "national" in nature. This is the first movement that could be termed as "national" in essence.[9]

Obviously, Takeuchi intended to transform these "Anpo Protests" into a social movement powered by the will and power of the Japanese people. He wanted them to become the spontaneous driving force fueling the engine of modernization, as did their Chinese counterparts. We could even conclude that Takeuchi wanted to compare the "Anpo Movement" in Japan to the May Fourth Movement in China. In his "Asia as Method," Takeuchi intentionally included Dewey's comments on the May Fourth Movement, underlining his high remarks on the spirits of Chinese students, which echoed with the spirit of Takeuchi himself during the Anpo Movement. When Prime Minister Kishi passed the Security Treaty, Takeuchi reacted immediately against the authoritarian government, commenting that "democracy or dictatorship, this is the biggest and the sole point of debate. Democracy if not dictatorship; dictatorship if not democracy. There is no middle ground."[10] Takeuchi's ground was

---

9 Takeuchi Yoshimi, "Go-ichi-kyu zengo no taishuundo wo do miruka" 五・一九前後の大衆運動をどう見るか, 192. The article was a report originally delivered on July 24, 1960.

10 Takeuchi Yoshimi, "Minshu ka dokusai ka" 民主か独裁か, in *Takeuchi Yoshimi zenshū*, vol. 9, 110. Originally published on June 4, 1960.

immediately attacked by other sects in the debates: Some argued that the focus of the Anpo Protests was and ought to be only on the Security Treaty, while Takeuchi's narrative had diverted the revolutionary force and was hence serving the enemies. Practical strategies in social movements aside, we could see the broader image of Takeuchi's aspiration merely from what he meant in his comment on "democracy or dictatorship." What he strove for was not only to abolish the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the US and Japan but, more importantly, to transform such nation-wide social protests into a national movement, so that the Japanese people could have a greater say and spontaneous power over state matters.

After his resignation, Takeuchi became more directly and more tactfully involved in various movements led by the Japanese people. One key contribution was that he, as a major scholar of sinology, spent great effort in changing Japanese people's perception of China. He did so by actively translating and publishing Chinese literature. He translated and edited an anthology of Lu Xun's 魯迅 (1881–1936) works, translated Mao Dun's 茅盾 (1896–1981) *Midnight: A Romance of China* (*Ziye* 子夜), Ye Shengtao's 葉聖陶 (1894–1988) *Ni Huanzhi* 倪煥之, and many other masterpieces of modern Chinese literature. Interestingly, apart from translating contemporary literature, Takeuchi also edited and published many Chinese classics, e.g., *Records of the Grand Historian* (*Shiji* 史記), *Analyects of Confucius* (*Lunyu* 論語), *Book of Changes* (*Yijing* 易經), *Laozi* 老子, *Mencius* (*Mengzi* 孟子), *Hanfeizi* 韓非子, *Mozi* 墨子, *Xunzi* 荀子. Since his college years, Takeuchi has been opposing the canonical way in which Japanese academics studied Chinese classics. When compiling this series of classical works, Takeuchi also avoided the traditional way of reading Chinese works but tried to translate them into contemporary, colloquial Japanese. His purpose was rather obvious: He wanted to overcome the conventional way by which the Japanese learned Chinese classics and in turn renew their image. Takeuchi wrote: "the reform should not stop at educating a new generation of translators, but should aim at identifying new readership."[11] This line clearly reveals his ambition.

[11] Takeuchi Yoshimi, "Kosei Osorubeshi," 362.

Among these activities, Takeuchi mostly focused on founding "Chinese Association" (*Chugoku no Kai* 中國の會) and publishing the academic magazine *China* (*Chugoku* 『中國』) starting from 1963. He was planning to publish a new book series, *New Books of China* (*Chugoku shinsho* 『中國新書』), organized the staff involved under a committee named Chugoku no Kai and titled the appendix brochure issued along with the books *Chugoku*. Even when the publisher committee of *New Books of China* later closed, Chugoku no Kai continued issuing *Chugoku* until 1972 and also held multifaceted activities. The publisher committee, Futsu-sha 普通社, closed in 1964, after which *Chugoku* underwent a period of self-funded publication until the staff found a new publisher (Tokuma shoten 徳間書店) in 1967. Tokuma Shoten also collaborated with Takeuchi in translating the aforementioned new series of Chinese classics.

Both Chugoku no Kai and the *Chugoku* magazine evidenced how Takeuchi put his ideals into practice. In almost every issue of *Chugoku*, Takeuchi had published a series of articles called "Get to Know China" (*Chugoku wo shiru tameni* 「中國を知るために」), which clearly demonstrated his attitude of valuing both the theoretical and the practical. First, the articles were written in an easily comprehensible way—a clear sign that the target readers were commoners with no specific background knowledge. Second, nothing discussed was abstract or political; rather, the focus of the series was on the details of the everyday life of Chinese people, such as the Chinese units of measurement. In the second issue, he wrote that

> The ideal approach for scholars of foreign literature is to learn everything about the country under study, especially life of the common people, or else there is no chance for proper translation . . . . I am writing about my opinion on literature studies, and I want to extend the application of this idea to the [understanding of] historical, political, and social mechanisms. We surprisingly know very little about China and we do not even notice such a vacuum of knowledge. To learn about and acknowledge our ignorance is the first step to "get to know China."[12]

[12] Takeuchi Yoshimi, "Chugoku wo shiru tameni" 中国を知るために, 8, 10. Originally published in 1963.

In this article illustrating the key point of "Get to Know China," Takeuchi tried hard to capture and convey the original and authentic image of the Chinese people's lives. This attempt echoes with what Takeuchi has proposed in "China as Method": For him, to know the Chinese folks was the basis for knowing China as a whole and the starting point for rallying the Japanese public. He underlined that studying China is not just an academic matter but rather a social movement that has the potential of initiating structural changes. Takeuchi was not sidelining academics; his point was that knowledge has no purpose, and it could even be harmful if it does not serve to foster a mindset change in one's view of China. Takeuchi has always paid attention to refining his knowledge by observing the everyday details of the public. The ultimate goal here was to let the Japanese "know China" and hence renovate their perceptual structures and thoughts so that they could redirect the course of Japan through their own spontaneous power. With such consideration in mind, Takeuchi insisted on publishing straightforward articles in every issue.

During his preparation of Chugoku no Kai and the "Get to Know China" series, Takeuchi edited an anthology of Japanese Asianism and wrote a long explanatory essay titled "Prospects for Asianism" (later "Japan's Asianism," when compiled in the commentary collection). This collection on Asianism was part of the *Modern Japanese Thought Series* 『現代日本思想大系』 published by Chikuma Shobo 築摩書房. The *Modern Japanese Thought Series* is a 35-volume collection of important works in the intelligentsia—from the anthologies of figures such as Fukuzawa Yukichi 福澤諭吉 and Nishida Kitaro 西田幾多郎 to works on social ideologies such as nationalism and socialism. In contrast to these aforementioned works, the trend of thought of Asianism was not widely acknowledged and studied. Japanese intellectuals' understandings of Asianism were different and hard to generalize; a thornier problem was, as discussed, that many Japanese scholars had negative and ambivalent attitudes toward it. As a result, Takeuchi had to define this "undefined" trend of thought on the one hand and excavate meaningful seeds of thoughts from a piece of abandoned land on the other hand.

Takeuchi did not make extra effort to select articles on China; interestingly, however, he did so with Asianism. The logic of this approach

was pinpointed in "Asia as Method": Takeuchi sought to research into the nature of China and hence find the differences between Japan and China. From this line of discussion, he drew the conclusion that Japan's modernization "was not the absolute or only way for Eastern countries or the later developing countries to modernize themselves. There are other possibilities, other paths ahead."[13] Although he studied China in depth, he did not treat it as a special or superior case and extended his argument to emphasize the variety of possibilities of Asia. There was also a historical context of this "Asian perspective": A strike to many, nationalism was on its rise in many Asian and African countries at the time—the landmark being the Bandung Conference in 1955.

Takeuchi wrote an article titled "Asia's Nationalism" at the time that the Bandung Conference was successfully held and argued that,

> There are now only two ways to emancipate Asia from imperialism: One is to make use of imperialism by oneself, the other is to uproot imperialism from this world once and for all. Amongst the Asian countries, Japan had taken the former path, while countries including China had chosen the latter. They abandoned exclusive nationalism and rallied behind nationalism based on the principle of "association of the weak."[14]

The above quote suggests that Takeuchi did not regard Chinese nationalism as specific to a country but rather as a typical case from where the traits of nationalism in various Asian countries could be drawn. The Bandung Conference had enabled him to see an Asian nationalism taking shape in a political sense, with its core being the "association of the weak." Takeuchi also participated in an emergency meeting of Afro-Asian writers in Tokyo in 1961 and wrote:

> The biggest lesson [from this meeting] is that an image of the Afro-Asian is substantializing in my mind, although still in its nascent

[13] Takeuchi, "Hoho to shite no Ajia," 96.
[14] Takeuchi Yoshimi, "Ajia no nashonorizumu" アジアのナショナリズム, in *Takeuchi Yoshimi zenshū*, vol. 5, 7. Originally published in 1955.

> stage. There were around thirty representatives from different countries planning to attend the meeting, while only eighteen of them actually came to Tokyo. Apart from China which has dispatched around ten representatives, other countries sent several or only one. Therefore, the total number of participants was not that big so that during their three-day stay, even if there was no direct communication between us, we could remember each other's faces and it was such a pleasant experience. I would become very excited whenever I looked afar at their appearances in the venue, the hotel lobby, and the cafeteria.[15]

Takeuchi did in fact have direct contact with writers of different countries to deepen his understanding of Afro-Asian thoughts, and he paid special attention to their "faces." For him, as a bridge for communication, "faces" introduce Takeuchi to a broader Afro-Asian world on the one hand and disclose the de-facto ethnic differences among Afro-Asian countries on the other hand, revealing the diversity of the Afro-Asian continents. By the same token as in Beiping 1932, he not only sought to walk into the inner world of the representatives at the conference, but he also aimed to realize their being as the "other" while communicating.[16]

Takeuchi seized this inspiration acquired from the Bandung Conference and meetings with the Afro-Asian writers—however abstract it still was—to further his understanding of Asian nationalism and also to refine his own thought process. As his goal was to induce a mindset change among the Japanese public by learning about Asia, Takeuchi then started the tradition of "association of the weak" in history—toward Japan's Asianism.

"Prospects for Asianism"

Takeuchi started working on Asianism and wrote the introductory essay

[15] Takeuchi Yoshimi, "Kao wo nagameru" 顔を眺める, in *Takeuchi Yoshimi zenshū*, vol. 5, 215–16. Originally published in 1961.

[16] With regard to Takeuchi's description of "faces," one could refer to Emmanuel Lévinas' philosophy.

in 1963, i.e., three years after the Anpo Movement, two years after the Emergency Meeting of Afro-Asian Writers in Tokyo, and during the preparation stage of Chugoku no Kai. According to his diary, he had to start reading through the books at home in order to compile the collection of Asianism in Chikuma Shobo's book series.[17] Although he "had to," he was actually very much immersed in the work; by April, he had already decided to divide the anthology into four parts: "prototypes," "emotions," "theories," and "reincarnation." This framework is rather intriguing as will be scrutinized in the following section. It is relevant that, on the same day that he wrote this piece of diary, Takeuchi showed his own attitudes:

> Once starting to sort out materials for the topic I soon came to realize that meaningful pieces on Asianism are almost non-existent, despite the plethora of books and essays on the so-called Asianism. No wonder people detest the topic. This kind of Asianism that appeals to power should be uprooted.[18]

The relationship between Asianism and power is among the most intricate. Despite sparing no effort in deconstructing this intricacy in "Prospects for Asianism," Takeuchi had to admit that something remained understudied and unresolved. Due to such attitudes, he has constantly been criticized for defending the invasion. However, his real stance could not be any clearer as in this piece of diary in which he said that "this kind of Asianism that appeals to power should be uprooted."

Another piece of diary written in May showed how Takeuchi defined the concept of Asianism:

> I want to take this perspective: Simple oversea expansion and expansionism do not compose Asianism, and it is also very different from fascism [as for the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere]. All of the essays and thoughts I have selected show, in some sense,

[17] Takeuchi Yoshimi, "Tenkeiki: Sengo nikki shō" 転形期：戦後日記抄, in *Takeuchi Yoshimi zenshū*, vol. 16, 372.
[18] Ibid., 381.

> anti-authority and anti-government sentiments. Such might be a coincidence, but a second thought tells me such is in fact very natural.[19]

From April to May 1963, Takeuchi was translating Mao Dun's *Midnight: A Romance of China*, while conceiving the article for Asianism. There is no evidence of whether the translation of *Midnight* had any influence on Takeuchi's conceptualization of Asianism, but as early as May 1963, the core components of "Prospects for Asianism" had already been there. Based on the structure outlined in May, Takeuchi started writing.

"Prospects for Asianism" originated from the definition of Asianism but acknowledged from the start that "what I [Takeuchi] consider as Asianism is not composed of substantial, objectively-definable thoughts, but rather a tendency."[20] Under this premise, he added,

> That is to say, Asianism does not stand in line with expansionism or invasionism; nor does it converge with nationalism or left-wing internationalism completely. However, Asianism does partially overlap with every one of them and actually does share much in common with expansionism.[21]

This is the general idea that Takeuchi had on Japanese Asianism. He did not seek to establish an "objectively defined" set of ideas but rather wanted to investigate the ambiguous field where various "-isms" (various ideologies) overlap. That is, he did not want to create Asianism similar to any of the other "-isms" but to collect the segments of active factors scattered among different ideologies and to combine those segments, which are far from forming "-isms." We could even say that he sought not established thoughts but abandoned seeds of thoughts.

Therefore, while Takeuchi acknowledged the overlap between Asianism and expansionism, he especially underlined the essential

---

[19] Ibid., 388.

[20] Takeuchi Yoshimi, "Ajia shugi no tenbo" アジア主義の展望, in *Nihon to Ajia* 日本とアジア, 12.

[21] Ibid.

difference between Asianism as he understood it and the one proposed by the Japanese government. The second section of "Prospects for Asianism" tackled the problem of so-called Asianism. He wrote:

> "The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" was a pseudo-ideology that sought to suppress all other thoughts including Asianism. An ideology could not be called ideology if it is not productive, as in the case with the Co-Prosperity Sphere. Or to say, the very purpose of diffusing such a top-down, oppressive ideology by the government is to bring down all thoughts—this whole "Co-Prosperity Sphere" was the biggest trap.[22]

Takeuchi pinpointed the hypocrisy underneath Japan's pre-war "Greater Asia" agenda. He maintained that thoughts and ideology need productivity and, if we refer back to the ideals upheld by him, it could be said that the productivity pivotal to thoughts is a propelling force that could ignite social movements. What superficially rallies behind state policy is not thoughts but that which generates the spontaneous power among the public. On the one hand, Takeuchi saw no successful Asianism in modern Japanese history; on the other, he insisted that deep within the everyday spirits of Japanese people lies the tendency of "associating the weak"; therefore, he tried to dig out the fragmented pieces of Asianist spirits preserved in modern Japanese thoughts.

Takeuchi tackled two issues here: How to present the Asianist ideals hidden deep within modern Japanese thoughts and why the seed of Japanese Asianism had failed to sprout into an influential trend and was suffocated by nationalism. Takeuchi built his argument around these two conundrums.

The text of "Prospects for Asianism" is not easy to read as it did not follow a chronological order to recount the development of Asianism. After discussing the "basis of Asianism" in the third chapter, Takeuchi looked back to situations in the 1880s from Chapter 4 to Chapter 7. According to him, the 1880s vividly showcased the "complex process of

[22] Ibid., 14.

separation and combination" between invasionism and unitism (the "association of the weak" spirit).[23] A piece of historical context here is that the 1880s were also the years during which Japan started establishing and reforming its modern national institutions. The Constitution was enacted in 1889, making Japan a constitutional state; furthermore, throughout the 1880s, the whole country underwent structural and institutional reforms (including laws), and at the same time, public opinions flourished. In a subjective sense, at least, the public have come up with ideas and thoughts earlier and in a more progressive way than the state did, urging it to accept their proposals (Asianism being one of them). Of course, in reality the state had to deploy their strategies also in response to macroscopic situations. Thus, during this period, ideation in the public sphere was basically in line with conception of national policy, and this entanglement of thoughts and ideas lay the groundwork for the "complex process of separation and combination" of Japan's Asianism. In "Prospects for Asianism," Takeuchi explained the situation in the 1880s from four cases: Tenyu-Kyo 天佑侠, who intervened in the Donghak Peasant Revolution; Oi Kentaro 大井憲太郎, who planned out revolutions in Japan; Tarui Tokichi 樽井藤吉, who envisioned a Japan-Korean fusion on the basis of equality; and Fukuzawa Yukichi, who proposed "Leaving Asia" 「脱亜論」—although based on the same consideration as Tarui. Strictly speaking, all four streams of thoughts were public and different from national policies; moreover, in a subjective sense, all their proposals had preceded the pace of the state, and some of them even felt betrayed by their government at some point. The very ambiguous relationship between these four sets of thoughts and the national policies have also left a rather intractable historical problem.

Interestingly, although Takeuchi used many sections to explain the situations in the 1880s, he only included one piece written by Tarui Tokichi on the equalizing fusion of Greater Asia. This suggests that Takeuchi intended to illustrate the intricate situations faced by Japan's Asianism from different perspectives, but he was not necessarily in favor of any of the thoughts introduced. The narration of Fukuzawa's case exemplified

[23] Ibid., 25.

Takeuchi's own attitudes. Fukuzawa was clearly not an Asianist but rather an anti-Asianist intellectual; nevertheless, Takeuchi did see in Fukuzawa's perspective the same problems as in those of Asianist scholars. They both saw Japan in the position of the weak, and while Asianists hence sought association among the weak, Fukuzawa turned to leaving Asia and adopting Western civilization instead. Takeuchi argued that only when Fukuzawa's crisis awareness is precisely captured could one understand Japanese Asianism in a holistic view. In other words, what Takeuchi did in these sections is to illustrate the spiritual basis from which Japan's Asianism was conceived and the difficulties in implementing those ideals.

After the 1880s, Takeuchi wrote about Okakura Tenshin 岡倉天心, who was the closest-to-ideal Asianist in his opinion. One year before writing "Prospects for Asianism," Takeuchi also wrote a commentary on Okakura.[24] Okakura upheld the idea of "Asia as one," which was utilized as a slogan and justification for invasion by pre-war Japanese nationalists; he was therefore regarded as a dangerous intellectual. However, after a detailed examination of Okakura's life and experiences, Takeuchi discovered that, surprisingly, Okakura had envisioned "Asia as one" only after feeling defeated and disillusioned by the pro-West modernization process (the so-called *Bunmei kaika* ぶんめいかいか文明開化 in Japanese). Therefore, Takeuchi argued that

> For Okakura Tenshin, aesthetics [and religion which is almost synonymous with beauty] is of the highest value and civilization is the measure to realize such value. Aesthetics is rooted in human nature and not something unique to the West. Following this line of argument, Okakura found it necessary and urgent to change the mindset of "the glory of Europe is the humiliation of Asia," and hence it is necessary to bring forth the idea of "Asia as one."[25]

In Takeuchi's opinion, Okakura has placed "esthetics" on top of politics and even of civilization. Moreover, this estheticism has opened a pathway

[24] Takeuchi Yoshimi, "Okakura Tenshin" 岡倉天心. Originally published in 1962.
[25] Takeuchi, "Ajia shugi no tenbo," 42–43.

to modernization different from that of the West, thereby also creating the Asianist ideal that refuses to vassalize the West.

Another reason that "Prospects for Asianism" was not an easy piece of reading is that, although expected to be an introduction to the anthology on Asianism, it was only loosely tied to the anthology itself. As noted, even though Takeuchi elaborated on situations back in the 1880s in great detail, only Tarui's piece was included; even the part that discussed Okakura, of whom Takeuchi spoke highly of, has disregarded chronology and was compiled alongside the discussion on Tarui's ideas in the "Prototype" section.[26] Once again, this highlights that Takeuchi did not regard Asianism as a concrete "-ism [ideology]" but rather as fragmented pieces of thoughts yet to take shape. The prototype he proposed in this anthology, likewise, does not make up the foundation of an ideology but the representation of Japanese people's general tendency toward Asianist ideals. The tendencies are twofold: One is association on the basis of equality as proposed by Tarui, and the other is Oriental estheticism exemplified by Okakura. Together, these two streams of thoughts composed the very basis of Japan's Asianism from which various variations and evolutions of Japanese Asianism sprouted and thrived.

---

[26] The Table of Contents of *Asianism* showcased how well-crafted Takeuchi's ideation process is:
I "Prototypes"
Okakura Tenshin, *Ideals of the East*
Tarui Tokichi, *Discussion of a Great Eastern Union [Daito Gappo Ron]*
II "Emotions"
Miyazaki Toten, *Dream of Thirty-Three Years [Sanjusan-nen no Yume]*
Hirayama Shu, *Biography of Yamada Yoshimasa [Yamada Yoshimasa-kun Den]*
Fujimoto Naonori, *Kyojin Toyama Mitsuru O*
Soma Kokko, *Memorandum of Rash Behari Bose [Rasu Bihari Bosu Oboegaki]*
III "Theories"
Uchida Ryohei, *Japanese Annexation of Korea [Nikkan Gappo]*
Ogawa Shumei, *Revolution in Europe and Rebirth in Asia [Kakumei Yoroppa to Fukko Ajia]*
Ogawa Shumei, *Door of Ease [Anraku no Mon]*
Ozaki Hotsumi, *"East Asia Cooperative Community" Ideal and Its Objective Foundation ['Toa-Kyodotai' no Rinen to Sono Seiritsu no Kyakkanteki Kiso]*
Ozaki Hotsumi, *Records of Interrogations by the Prosecutor [Kenji Jinmon Chosho]*
IV "Reincarnation"
Izuka Koji, *Nationalism in Asia [Ajia no Nashonarizumu]*
Ishimoda Sho, *Kotoku Shusui and China [Kotoku Shusui to Chugoku]*
Hotta Yoshie, *Japanese Intellectuals [Nihon no Chishiki-Jin]*

After elaborating on the "Prototype" of Asianism and introducing the readers to the two basic components of Japan's Asianism, Takeuchi turned to "Emotions" and "Theories." These two sections demonstrated another aspect among the problems mentioned by Takeuchi, namely, the fundamental cause of the short life of Asianism in Japan. In Chapter 10 of "Prospects for Asianism," "Resetting the Problem," Takeuchi inquired:

> During this period there was a cleavage between "emotions" and "theories," or to say the theories were reduced to theories for invasionism and only the worst part of ideologies upheld by the Black Dragon Society 黒龍會 remained. Why was it? And when did it happen?[27]

Takeuchi believed that the widening cleavage between emotions and theories resulted in the doom of Asianism in Japan. To understand exactly in what way the two were at odds with each other, Takeuchi included pieces that were representative of emotions and of theories, respectively. As reasons for such cleavage, Takeuchi wrote:

> From the mid-Taisho era to early Showa era, Asianism was grasped by the right exclusively in the grapples between the right and the left, and the latter fought back with proletarian internationalism. In the leftist camp, many had dropped out in face of nationalism and many of them found shelter in Asianism and Saigo Takamori 西郷隆盛 [as in Hayashi Fusao's 林房雄 "On Tenko"「転向について」]. The turning point when Asianism started to be monopolized by the right could be dated back to when the right split with the left, i.e., late Meiji era.[28]

The late Meiji period was also the dawn of the 1911 Revolution in China—the time when many Japanese Asianists aligned with the United League of China 中國同盟會 led by Sun Yat-Sen 孫中山. It was widely known that Asianist Miyazaki Toten 宮崎滔天 actively supported Sun's revolutions in China. However, Takeuchi pointed out that, while these

[27] Takeuchi, "Ajia shugi no tenbo," 50.
[28] Ibid., 51–52.

Asianists did sympathize with the "association of the weak" sentiment, they did not converge with nor go as far as the sublime cause undertaken by Okakura. That is to say, even though they sympathized with Asianism, it actually did not transform into an ideology as it did not motivate spontaneous movements among the public. Therefore, their belief was prone to encroachment from the right and was, in fact, later utilized as the cause of invasion. On the other hand, left-wing activists with lofty causes were too detached from the reality of Asia and the nations within; hence, they were not forces for Asianism in a real sense.

Takeuchi had also noticed that many left-wing activists dropped out of their camp in the face of nationalism and "many of them found shelter in Asianism and Saigo Takamori." Why Saigo? It was a question that Takeuchi raised at last. Saigo had been active in the founding stage of the Meiji Restoration, until he had led the dissatisfied former warrior class to rebel against the nascent Meiji government and committed suicide after the rebellion and defeat. By an official statement, Saigo represented the conservative diehards unable to adapt to the new era; among the public, however, there had always been sympathy for him. Takeuchi discovered that many former leftists looked back to Saigo after their "conversion" (*Tenko* 転向) and commented that he had later become a symbol for the right in Japan and that the left had not carried on the "way" that was first explored by Saigo. The point of contention was what this "way" meant. Takeuchi wrote: "I would rather raise a point not to regard Saigo, but rather to regard the Meiji government that had expelled him as anti-revolutionary."[29] Understanding this comment alongside Takeuchi's view toward the modernization process in Japan from the Meiji era, we could interpret that he actually implied the possibility of Saigo as a representative of civil movements in Japan; after the government banished him, the social movements he represented also fell short of an influential wave. Does not the phenomenon by which former left-wing activists who had originally fought for a noble cause had nostalgic feelings toward Saigo mean that he is precisely a symbol of the Japanese

[29] Ibid., 62.

civic movement? Does not his defeat also symbolize the defeat of Japanese Asianism?

However, it was hard to understand why Takeuchi did not expand on the relationship between Saigo and civic movements in Japan in "Prospects for Asianism" beyond the following comments:

> Whether to regard Saigo as an anti-revolutionary or symbol of permanent revolution is not a question easy to answer. Nevertheless, we could never get close to the concept of Asianism without acknowledging the relevance of this question. That is to say, if we see Asianism as a medium, we might find a way to approach the question. That is how I position our questions here.[30]

This intricate question was then left for the readers to tackle.

Conclusion

Takeuchi's overly brief discussion on Saigo triggered all kinds of comments. Matsumoto Kenichi 松本健一, for example, who was greatly influenced by Takeuchi, showed his disagreement in his comments:

> Giving some thoughts on it, is not directing the problem in "Prospects for Asianism" to evaluation on Saigo a misplacement of discussion? But that is not to say that we cannot grasp Takeuchi's ideas: discourses on Asianism usually begin with contentions over conquering the Korean Peninsula and therefore necessitates the evaluation of Saigo's proposals as well. Even so, what Saigo's problem led to is not Asianism but rather Nationalism. From this perspective, I consider "Prospects for Asianism" a failure.[31]

Matsumoto sought to have a clear-cut definition of Asianism and nationalism and accused Takeuchi of confusing the two concepts.

---

[30] Ibid., 63.

[31] Matsumoto Kenichi, *Takeuchi Yoshimi ron: Kakumei to chinmoku* 竹内好論：革命と沈黙, 254. Originally published in 1975.

Moreover, Matsumoto was not merely criticizing nationalism but arguing that "Prospects for Asianism" should have dug deeper into the intricacy between Asianism and fascism, or else the valuable components of Asianism could not be identified and secured. Although his points make sense, and Takeuchi did have the same intention, Takeuchi did not limit his focus to "securing the valuable components of Asianism."

Reading the two pieces ("Asia as Method" and "Prospects for Asianism") together, we could discern the very foundation of Takeuchi's ideals: His starting point is to encounter Chinese people as the other and hence to explore the diverse possibilities of modernization in Asia. Two thought processes are at play here: First, Takeuchi sought to examine the modernization experiences in depth; second, he sought to reflect on the problems that lie in Japan's modernization process. After the Anpo Movement, he tried to put his ideals into practice through literary activities and to encourage thought movements among the public. We could go as far as arguing that the comments on Saigo at the end of "Prospects for Asianism" are not only relevant to the history of Japan's Asianism but also pivotal to Takeuchi's call for public engagement through readership. In other words, Takeuchi's attempt does not only imply reevaluating and learning from Japan's Asianism retrospectively but also prospectively recreating the thoughts that had once failed. The last part of the anthology, titled "Reincarnation," was a collection of writings on Asianism in postwar Japan, which is another hint of Takeuchi's purpose. If we recall the title of the whole article, "Prospects for Asianism," the following question arises: Is not "prospects" a word precise enough to illustrate Takeuchi's purpose?

Unfortunately, Takeuchi's wish was not very efficiently conveyed to his readers. The Japanese still live in the void of Asianism; on the other hand, some successors have actively touched upon Takeuchi's ideas. For instance, intellectual and social activist Kan Takayuki 菅孝行 developed his ideas from Takeuchi's thinking and engaged in a theoretical examination of Asia.[32] However, the general trend was that the "association of the weak" idea waned with the soaring economy of the

[32] Kan Takayuki, *Takeuchi Yoshimi ron—Ajia e no hanka* 竹内好論——アジアへの反歌, 1976.

1960s, which has made Japan one of the major powers in the world and brought essential changes to the everyday life of Japanese people. From the twenty-first century onward, Japan continues to lose the rationale for building connections between itself and Asia. What we are facing now is the ever-thickening barriers among the Asian countries that are likely to induce hostility and antipathy. In a certain sense, the Asianism that had once failed in the late Meiji period has, even with Takeuchi's writings, failed again due to its inability to transform into an influential thought movement. Nevertheless, Japan still needs Asianism, even though it is almost certain that the Asianism back in the Meiji era and that envisioned by Takeuchi could be hardly revived today. What we need is an Asianism for the twenty-first century—the content and formulation of which no longer repeat its precursors. In this case, Takeuchi's strong wish and originality in challenging intricate situations are good lessons for later attempts. Our attempts today start from, and could only start from, Takeuchi's ideation.

References

Kan, Takayuki. *Takeuchi Yoshimi ron—Ajia e no hanka* 竹内好論：亜細亜への反歌 (On Takeuchi Yoshimi: In response to Asia). Tokyo: Sanichi shobo, 1976.

Koyasu, Nobukuni. *Kindai no chōkoku towa nanika*「近代の超克」とは何か (What is "overcoming the modern"). Tokyo: Seidosha, 2008.

Kume, Sakao. *Takeuchi Yoshimi zenshū* 竹内好全集 (Complete works of Takeuchi Yoshimi). 17 vols. Tokyo: Chikuma shobo, 1981.

Matsumoto, Kenichi. *Takeuchi Yoshimi ron: Kakumei to chinmoku* 竹内好論：革命と沈黙 (On Takeuchi Yoshimi: Revolution and silence). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2005.

Takeuchi, Yoshimi. "Ajia no nashonorizumu" アジアのナショナリズム (Asia's nationalism). In *Takeuchi Yoshimi zenshū* (Complete works of Takeuchi Yoshimi), translated by Wenli Xiong, vol. 5, 6–8. Tokyo: Chikuma shobo, 1981.

———. "Ajia shugi no tenbo" アジア主義の展望 (Prospects for Asianism). In *Nihon to Ajia* 日本とアジア (Japan and Asia), 10–28. Tokyo: Chikuma shobo, 1963.

———. "Chugoku wo Shiru Tameni" 中国を知るために (Get to know China). In *Takeuchi Yoshimi zenshū* (Complete works of Takeuchi Yoshimi), vol. 10, 3–171. Tokyo: Chikuma shobo, 1981.

———. "Go-ichi-kyu zengo no taishu-undo wo do miruka" 五・一九前後の大衆運動をどう見るか (How to view the National Movements around May 19th). In *Takeuchi Yoshimi*

zenshū (Complete works of Takeuchi Yoshimi), vol. 9, 190–208. Tokyo: Chikuma shobo, 1981.

———. "Hoho to shite no Ajia" 方法としてのアジア (Asia as method). In *Takeuchi Yoshimi zenshū* (Complete works of Takeuchi Yoshimi), translated by Wenli Xiong, vol. 5, 90–114. Tokyo: Chikuma shobo, 1981.

———. "Kao wo nagameru" 顔を眺める (Looking at the faces). In *Takeuchi Yoshimi zenshū* (Complete works of Takeuchi Yoshimi), vol. 5, 213–17. Tokyo: Chikuma shobo, 1981.

———. "Kosei Osorubeshi" 後生畏るべし (Youth should be regarded with respect). In *Takeuchi Yoshimi zenshū* (Complete works of Takeuchi Yoshimi), vol. 13, 360–362. Tokyo: Chikuma shobo, 1981.

———. "Minshu ka dokusai ka" 民主か独裁か (Democracy or autarchy). In *Takeuchi Yoshimi zenshū*, (Complete works of Takeuchi Yoshimi), vol. 9, 109–13. Tokyo: Chikuma shobo, 1981.

———. "Okakura Tenshin" 岡倉天心. In *Takeuchi Yoshimi zenshū* (Complete works of Takeuchi Yoshimi), vol. 8, 162–76. Tokyo: Chikuma shobo, 1981.

———. "Pekin nikki" 北京日記 (Travels in Beijing). In *Takeuchi Yoshimi zenshū* (Complete works of Takeuchi Yoshimi), vol. 15, 133–394. Tokyo: Chikuma shobo, 1981.

———. "Son bun kan no mondaiten" 孫文觀の問題點 (The problem of Sun Wen's view). In *Takeuchi Yoshimi zenshū* (Complete works of Takeuchi Yoshimi), vol. 5, 25–41. Tokyo: Chikuma shobo, 1981.

———. "Tenkeiki: Sengo nikki shō" 転形期：戦後日記抄 (Transition phase). In *Takeuchi Yoshimi zenshū* (Complete works of Takeuchi Yoshimi), vol. 16, 213–524. Tokyo: Chikuma shobo, 1981.