Front. Hist. China 2011, 6(1): 117–137
DOI 10.1007/s11462-011-0123-2

RESEARCH ARTICLES

Antonia Finnane

Tailors in 1950s Beijing: Private Enterprise, Career Trajectories, and Historical Turning Points in the Early PRC

© Higher Education Press and Springer-Verlag 2011

Abstract How new was the New China? This article explores the experience of Beijing tailors in the early years of the PRC in light of this question. After 1949, many long-established tailors simply continued to ply their trade in their old business premises, giving a strong impression of continuity in the social fabric of the city. They were increasingly challenged, however, by newcomers to the industry, including petty entrepreneurs who chose to invest in a socially useful trade, and the graduates of newly established sewing schools, usually women. Policy shifts from the New Democracy period through the "three anti" and "five anti" campaigns to the eve of the socialist transformation in 1956 affected old and new businesses, men and women, in different ways. Overall, the reduction in entrepreneurial freedoms that characterizes this period of Chinese business history was, in this sector of industry and commerce, most strikingly manifest in limitations on what tailors were licensed to make, which had effects on what Beijing people wore. From these various perspectives, 1949 can be seen to be a rather clear dividing line in the history of Beijing, but it was possibly a rather faint line at first, becoming darker and thicker as the 1950s progressed—or should that be "regressed?"

Keywords 1950s Beijing, tailors, "five anti" campaign, socialist transformation

The year 1949 has been scrutinized from a number of perspectives, usually with the question of "change and continuity" hovering in the background somewhere.

Received June 28, 2010

Antonia Finnane (✉)
School of Historical Studies, University of Melbourne, Victoria 3010, Australia
E-mail: afinnane@gmail.com

The effect has been to render the idea of 1949 rather complex.[1] This was a year of change, constituting a dividing line between two governments, marking ends and beginnings. Yet in some respects the line was permeable. Certainly the impact of developments in the first half of the century can be seen everywhere in the second half, and in some respects it could be argued that even if threads of continuity were broken in 1949, they were picked up again in the Reform Era. A case in point is consumption in contemporary China, which is sometimes analyzed as a Reform Era "revolution" but arguably has deep roots in Republican-era consumer culture.[2]

History has many subjects, and points made about a society considered over a long time-span are not necessarily germane to the historical experience of particular cohorts of people. For those who fled the PRC at its inception, and also for many who came back from overseas to participate in the creation of New China, 1949 was a year of no return. Yet it took a while for this to become apparent. During the New Democracy period, or at least until 1952, it seemed possible that China would have a gentler, more gradualist government than proved to be the case. The onset of the "three anti" and the "five anti" campaigns dashed such hopes, sending China off on the Stalinist road in the view of Jia Xiumei 贾秀梅 among others.[3] Or were those campaigns necessary for the New Democracy to work, as Party historian Zhang Hao 张浩 has recently argued?[4] If so, the great divide might be found in the slightly later "socialist transformation" of China, rather than in the Communist victory in 1949 or the "five anti" campaign in 1952.

This debate, part of an ongoing discussion over where China went off the rails in the 1950s, identifies the temporal and policy frameworks within which hundreds of millions of people in China adjusted to life in the early years of the PRC. In the present article, a pilot study of *chengyipu* 成衣铺 (tailor shops) in

---

[1] Paul Cohen, "The 1949 Divide," in *Twentieth-Century China: New Approaches* ed. Jeffrey Wasserstrom (London: Routledge, 2003), 31; Gail Hershatter, "The Gender of Memory: Rural Chinese Women and the 1950s," *Signs*, 28, 1 (2002), 43–4.

[2] See Deborah Davis ed., *The Consumer Revolution in Urban China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), and Karl Gerth, *As China Goes, So Goes the World: How Chinese Consumers Are Transforming Everything* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010).

[3] Jia Xiumei, "Lun 'wufan' yundong dui Zhongguo minzu zichan jieji de yingxiang ji qishi—jianlun dui xin minzhuzhuyi zhidu de yingxiang" [The influence and stimulus of the 'five anti' campaign on China's national bourgeoisie, and its influence also on New Democracy], *Beijing Xingzheng xueyuan xuebao* [Journal of Beijing Administrative College], no. 5 (2008), 106–9.

[4] Zhang Hao, "Jianguo chuqi Zhongguo gongchandang de siren zibenzhuyi zhengce—yi Beijingshi wei ge'an" [CPC's policies on private capitalism in the early PRC—the case of Beijing municipality], *Jingji guancha: qiye daobao* [Economic observer: Business guide], no. 7 (2009), 7–10.

Beijing, these adjustments are studied with reference to a particular sector of economic life in the capital. The study draws on Bureau of Industry and Commerce records held in the Beijing Municipal Archives. Initially studied as part of a project on the effects of policy shifts on small shops in the 1950s, the tailor files also suggested some more precise questions. To speak of tailors in the context of Chinese history is to evoke Republican-era Shanghai, with its thousands of Ningbo 宁波 and Su-Guang 苏广 tailors stitching away in the service of China's most fashion-conscious community.[5] Even in the Reform Era, Shanghai's fashion scene was characterized by the role of tailors.[6] Who were the tailors of Beijing? How did the change of government affect their careers, if at all? What part did they play in "fashioning" the New China?

These are questions about ordinary people and everyday life in a period of extraordinary change. Given that there were over two thousand tailor shops in Beijing municipality in 1952, the answers supplied here can do little more than suggest the importance of the questions, but in light of what we know about tailors and clothing in the same city in the first half of the century, they help to elucidate the distinction between life before and after 1949. In *Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times*, Sheila Fitzpatrick explored "everyday interactions that in some way involved the state," in the USSR in the 1930s.[7] There were many such interactions, and the gross intrusion of the Stalinist state into private life at this time is one of the reasons why Fitzpatrick dubbed the 1930s "extraordinary." The Bureau of Industry and Commerce files in Beijing shed little light on the tailors' personal lives (for which the term "private" is often reserved),[8] but when we compare the turning points in their working lives before and after 1949, the term "extraordinary" seems as appropriate in the Chinese case as in the Russian.

Tailors and Their Origins: From Beijing to Beiping

Although Shanghai has long been viewed as China's fashion capital, Beijing was for centuries home to the elite of the empire, and no less than modernizing

[5] Hanchao Lu, *Beyond the Neon Lights: Everyday Shanghai in the Early Twentieth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 255.

[6] Antonia Finnane, "China on the Catwalk: Between Economic Success and Nationalist Anxiety," in *Culture in the Contemporary PRC*, eds. Michael Hockx and Julia Strauss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 79.

[7] Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 3.

[8] One of the few studies of private life in the PRC is founded on exactly this equation. See Yunxiang Yan, *Private Life under Socialism: Love, Intimacy and Family Change in a Chinese Village, 1949–1999* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).

Shanghai required the services of good tailors. In Beijing, as well as in Shanghai at a later date, the ranks of tailors were historically dominated by men from Ningbo prefecture, who may even have been among the tradesmen transported north at the founding of the new Ming capital in 1420. Steles from the "Zhejiang Cixi Huiguan" 浙江慈溪会馆 (Assembly hall of Cixi, Zhejiang) in Beijing document the importance of Cixi county in particular as a source of tailors through the Qing dynasty. They were numerous enough to establish a trade association no later than 1772, and their reputation was such that apprentices came to them from all over the empire.[9] In the late Qing and Republican eras, the Ningbo tailors produced some of the best makers of Western suits. These Western-style tailors were known as the *hongbang* 红帮 (Red Gang), a reference to the *hongmao* 红毛 (red hairs), as foreigners were sometimes known.[10] Harbin is said to have been a more important source of Western-style tailors in Beijing, probably from the 1930s on, but the "Red Gang" certainly had its representatives there as well.[11]

In comparison with Shanghai, Beijing seemed a conservative place, and visitors were more likely to remark on the long robes and Manchu dress still in evidence there in the 1920s and 1930s than to record their impressions of modern dress. However, according to the "latest Beiping guidebook" published in 1935, both Zhongshan (Sun Yat-sen) suits and Western suits became popular among officials in the former capital in wake of the Northern Expedition. During the Nanjing Decade, while the long gown was re-establishing ascendancy as the distinctively nationalist form of clothing for men in Shanghai, *yang caifengpu* 洋裁缝铺 ("foreign" tailor shops) entered into their peak period of prosperity in the former capital.[12] Foremost among the "foreign" tailors were brothers Li Bingde 李秉德 and Bingsheng 秉生, "Red Gang" tailors originally based in Shanghai. They established a business in Wangfujing, the *Xinji xifuzhuang* 新记西服装 (Xinji Western Clothing Store), and in a crowded market, distinguished themselves by charging high prices and securing an elite clientele. Li Bingde

[9] Liu Yunhua, "Guanyu Ningbo benbang caifeng xiang Hongbang caifeng zhuanxing de hangye jichu de yanjiu" [Professional skills as the foundation for the transformation of Ningbo tailors into "Hongbang" tailors], *Zhejiang fangzhi fuzhuang zhiye jishu xueyuan xuexiao* [Journal of Zhejiang College of Textiles and Apparel], no. 1 (2009), 60–1.

[10] Lin Shujian and Lin Min, *Ningbo shangbang* [The Ningbo merchants] (Hong Kong: Zhonghua shuju, 1995), 33.

[11] Yang Jingya, "Bashi nianqian Ningbo xifudian jingcheng dingguagua" [Ningbo Western clothing store the tops in Beijing eighty years ago], *Ningbo wanbao* [Ningbo Evening Paper], 22/3/2004. The report is based on an interview with Chen Wanfeng, director of the Ningbo Fashion and Costume Museum.

[12] *Zuixin Beiping zhinan* [Latest guide to Beiping], cited in Zhang Jianming, Qi Dazhi, *Huashuo Jingshang* [All about Beijing merchants] (Beijing: Zhonghua gongshang lianhe chubanshe, 2006), 10.

could speak English, and the store, bearing the sign SINGKEE&CO, was well patronized by the foreigners who lived in this quarter of the city.[13]

Although Ningbo was a byword for tailors in Beijing, it is unlikely that the Ningbonese were numerically dominant in the trade. The file of Guo Dengying 郭登瀛, a native of Beijing, shows a not untypical career trajectory for a local tailor, who in the 1930s was plying his trade in Wangfujing, not far from the Li brothers. Guo was born in 1916, the year that Yuan Shikai 袁世凯 died. By the time he was thirteen, Beijing had been reduced to Beiping, perhaps with no great effect on him. At that age he left home to serve a four-year apprenticeship in the *Xinhua gongsi* 新华公司 (New China Clothing Company). It was common for apprentices to remain working in the company in which they trained, but Guo sought his opportunities elsewhere. His first position as a qualified tailor was with the *Qingnian fuzhuangdian* 青年服装店 (Youth Clothing Store) in Dong'an Market, Wangfujing, then the premier shopping center in the city. Established as a marketplace in 1903, Dong'an Market was located on the former military training ground for troops of the Qing dynasty. By 1933, it had evolved into baroque complex of business centers housing nearly a thousand traders. Guo remained there for two years, then worked at a second clothing store for six years, during which period Beiping was occupied by the Japanese and renamed Beijing.

In 1941 Guo went into business with a friend and established a business called the China Clothing Store at Dongsi 东四, due east of Wangfujing. He later moved the business to a laneway off Sifabu 司法部 ("Department of Justice") Street, between Tian'anmen 天安门 and Qianmen 前门—a street that disappeared when Tian'anmen Square was created. He remained there for three years before moving again, this time to Sifabu Street proper, where he was still in operation in 1949.[14] On October 1 that year, the People's Republic of China was formally declared. Mao Zedong wore a brown woolen Sun Yat-sen suit for the occasion, having firmly rejected the Western suit suggested to him by his chief of protocol.[15] Guo must have pondered the implications for his business.

Beijing after 1949: The City and the Citizens

For Beijing, the most immediate effect of the establishment of the New China was that it resumed the name and identity by which, as capital of China, it had been known for some centuries up until 1928, refurbishment followed. The

[13] Wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui ed., *Wangfujing* (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1993), 87; Yang Jingya, "Bashi nianqian Ningbo xifudian Jingcheng dingguagua."
[14] Beijing Municipal Archives (hereafter BJMA), 22-1-4/4.
[15] Li Zhisui, *The Private Life of Chairman Mao: the Memoirs of Mao's Personal Physician* (New York: Random House, 1994), 121.

physical transformation of the city in the 1950s is a familiar aspect of Chinese urban history. The project was partly driven by a Soviet-inspired vision of Beijing as industrial as well as political center, but the leadership was conscious of aesthetics. The new capital was to be beautiful, befitting the beauties of socialism. "A new, beautiful Peking is taking shape," declared Mayor Nie Rongzhen 聂荣臻 in 1951,[16] and he attributed the process to the fact that the state was now in the hands of the people. For architect Zhao Dongri 赵冬日, the greatly expanded Tian'anmen Square, flanked by the Great Hall of the People and the Museum of the Chinese Revolution, was "vast and splendid," and reflected "the revolutionary and combative spirit of the Chinese people."[17]

As it proved, the city proved easier to redesign than the populace. In 1955 the poet Ai Qing 艾青 was one of a number of leading figures in the arts world to point out the contradiction between the handsome new buildings of the capital and the tawdry clothing of its citizens. "Look along a street," he complained, "and all you can see is a great stretch of blue and black."[18] He was referring to the monotonous palette of street wear in 1950s Beijing. In fact, street wear in China was not known historically for brilliance and diversity: the empire of the "blue boiler suit" had evolved out of the "land of the blue gown."[19] In the Republican era, however, the street spectacle in Chinese cities had been transformed. The urban throng had once been male almost in its entirety. In the early decades of the twentieth century, it changed character as young women increasingly stepped out into the streets, on their way to work, school, or the shops. They were dressed in the variegated, colorful, fashionable clothes of the time. It was against this historical background that the blue and black worn by citizens of the New China appeared startlingly drab.

Perhaps more than any other aspect of life in Maoist China, clothing served as a sign of political change and a symbol of the new era. Without doubt, it is the feature of the "New China" on which foreign visitors most frequently commented. As I have suggested elsewhere, there is some evidence for such clothing being popular in the sense of people wanting to wear it (as opposed to the sense of it being worn by many people, although the latter sense obviously pertains, as well). Young men and women were embracing their times in the 1950s, and enthusiastically adopted a style of clothing that identified them with the Yan'an Way.[20] Sun Yat-sen suits, Lenin suits, and cadre suits—the "boiler

---

[16] *World News and Views*, vol. 31 (1951), 100.
[17] Jianfei Zhu, *Architecture of Modern China: A Historical Critique* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 97–8.
[18] *Xin Guancha banyuekan* [New Observer fortnightly], 16.4.1955, 24.
[19] Mrs. Archibald Little, *Land of the Blue Gown* (New York: Brentano's, 1902). For "blue boiler suit", see any number of works about China in the 1950s and 1960s, e.g., Frederick Nossal, *Dateline Peking* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1963), 200.
[20] Antonia Finnane, *Changing Clothes in China: Fashion, Nation, History* (London: Hurst, 2007), 225.

suits" or "Mao suits" of Western commentaries at the time—were at least to some degree the clothing of choice for progressive elements. It is even claimed that they were responsible for a boom in clothing manufacture in the early years of the PRC, which seems quite possible.[21] Certainly tailors at the time were busy *fangai* 翻改 ("making over") old clothes into appropriate new styles.[22]

For such clothing to be consistent with urban renovation in Beijing, architects would have had to turn to the classic archway and flat frontage of the Yan'an cave dwelling, rather than the big roof of the Chinese imperial tradition, or the straight lines of twentieth-century modern. As it was, architecture in revolutionary Beijing was in accordance with what Paul Cohen had termed "a consensual Chinese agenda,"[23] That is, many of the monumental new buildings built in the early PRC could equally well have been built under KMT rule. Clothing, on the other hand, suggests "substantive discontinuities" (to draw again on Cohen's phrasing)[24] across the 1949 divide. The Sun Yat-sen suit may well have been standard wear for functionaries within the KMT government, but unlike in the PRC, it never became the dominant form of clothing; nor did it have any appreciable impact on what women wore.

If Ai Qing had looked away from the broad boulevards and big buildings of the capital to its laneways and small shop fronts, he might have found fewer contradictions between the built environment and clothing culture of revolutionary China. In the early years of the PRC, the city's clothing stock in large part emerged from unremarkable, everyday, humdrum Beijing. In 1952, there were 2,415 tailor shops in the city, accounting for probably the majority of *geti shougongye* 个体手工业 (small handicraft enterprises). In 1956, these small enterprises were incorporated into state enterprises or absorbed into cooperatives. However, before the period of "socialist transformation," they gave a sense of continuity to life in Beijing while simultaneously contributing to the production of a distinctive "new look" for a New China. It was not a look admired by Ai Qing, but it was the look by which clothing in the New China came to be known.

Tailoring in Beijing, 1949–1955: The Policy Environment

It is unclear how many Beijing tailors emulated their peers in Shanghai and left China in 1949. The timing of the Communist Party's victory in the north may have forestalled the possibility. Such a decision was anyway not taken by Guo

[21] *Beijingshi Chongwenqu zhi* [District gazetteer of Chongwen district] (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 2004), 555.
[22] Ibid., 624.
[23] Cohen, "The 1949 Divide," 31.
[24] Ibid.

Dengying, who in 1952, still in Sifabu Street, applied for a license to trade as a private business under the commercial name *Zhonghe xifudian* 中和西服店 (China Peace Western Suit Store).[25] As for the famous SINKEE & CO store in Wangfujing, that had fallen on hard times during the war, when many of its elite customers—including numerous foreigners—were elsewhere. Its afterlife is instructive. Under the new regime, Li Bingsheng's eldest son, Li Shijie 李世杰, a graduate of Furen University, in Shanghai, set up the business on a new footing and with a new name, *Xinfeng xifuhang* 新丰西服行 (New Harvest Western Clothing Firm). Clients now were more likely to be Russian than British. They could still bring cloth to the store for to be made up into suits, but the business now placed great stress on providing the cloth to be made up. This may have been a consequence of state-planned purchase and supply of materials, which placed pressure and constraints on retail businesses. In 1956, the business became public-private joint enterprise, and in 1958, it was amalgamated with like businesses, and in effect ceased to exist.[26]

The circumstances under which Beijing tailor shops operated in the early years of the PRC can broadly be described by reference to major policy initiatives that affected private enterprise in China as a whole. In brief, during the first four years of the New China in Beijing, policy on capitalism and private enterprise was decided within the framework of "New Democracy," which specifically endorsed fostering a "new capitalism" in the service of socialism. In this period, not only did established businesses continue to operate, but also new businesses were established. The *Huakang fuzhuang hang* 华康服装行 (Huakang Clothing Firm) in *Meishi jie* 煤市街 (Coal Market Street), discussed further below, is an example. It was set up in 1951, by newcomers to the trade.

In much recent historical writing, "New Democracy" is hailed as the correct path, pre-eminently suited to China's conditions at the time.[27] But as Bennis So points out, the principles of *liyong* 利用 (making use of) and *xianzhi* 限制 (restricting) capitalism in this period were hardly compatible with functional capitalism, even if the government failed to anticipate their dysfunctional effects.[28] Further, during the New Democracy period, the government launched two major campaigns, the "three anti" and "five anti" campaigns, directed at cadres and capitalists respectively. The latter in particular was damaging to private enterprise, with a sharp reduction in or even complete cessation of

[25] BJMA, 22-1-4/4.
[26] Wang Yongbin, *Beijing de shangyejie he laozihao* [Beijing's commercial streets and old shop names] (Beijing: Beijing Yanshan chubanshe 1999), 457.
[27] See discussion in Bennis Wai-yip So, "The Policy-Making and Political Economy of Private Ownership in the Early 1950s: Findings from New Material," *China Quarterly*, no. 171 (2002), 703.
[28] So, "Policy-Making and Political Economy of Private Ownership in the Early 1950s," 684.

business while class struggle was conducted and legal infractions investigated.[29] The *Ruifuxiang choubudian* 瑞蚨祥绸布店 (Ruifuxiang Silk Store), an iconic commercial site in Dashila 大栅栏, typical in suffering a severe business downturn at this time.[30]

"Making use of" and "restricting" led willy-nilly to "transforming," as So has shown. In 1953, a policy of "socialist transformation of capitalist industry and commerce" was adopted. In 1953 and 1954 respectively, the grain and cotton trades were in turn taken over by the state. By the summer of 1955, nearly a quarter of all retail was conducted by merchants in the employ of or acting for the state.[31] By 1956, the policy had been substantially implemented, with the conversion of private enterprises joint private-public enterprises, as happened with Li Shijie's New Harvest Western Clothing Firm, or in the case of small businesses by the creation of cooperatives. In 1955 the Huakang Clothing *Firm* became the Huakang Clothing *Cooperative* (*she* 社), in a sign of the times.[32]

These shifts in policy generated much paper work. Private entrepreneurs who wished to continue to trade in 1949 applied for registration and were granted a license if approved. Those still in business in 1952 were obliged to apply again—apparently due to the "five anti" campaign. In October 1955, preparatory work for the social transformation of retailers was undertaken. Tailors were caught up in this drive. Over a period of less than a week, between the fifth and the tenth of the month, the Bureau of Commerce and Industry processed thousands of applications for the modification of the original trading licenses. These are now held in the Beijing Municipal Archives. A detailed file dating from this time might include the following: a license dated late 1949 (actually, *Minguo 38 nian*—the Republican dating system); a license dated 1952, together with an application for registration; and an application for modification of registration dated October 1955, leading up to the process of "transformation." Applicants were required to provide full details of their past work experience, the amount of capital in the business, the source of the capital, the number of people worked in the business and in what capacity; whether the owner or manager of the business also contributed labor; and how much machinery if any was owned

[29] Ibid., 696–7.
[30] Suo Yuanzhong and Liu Yuanbo, "Beijing 'ba da xiang' zhi shou Ruifuxiang choubudian shuaixian heying" [Ruifuxiang Silk Store, first among Beijing's "eight icons," takes the lead in forming a joint enterprise], in *Zhongguo zibenzhuyi gongshangye de shehuizhuyi gaizao: Beijing juan* [China's socialist transformation of capitalist industry and commerce: Beijing volume] ed. Beijingjuan bianjizu (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 1991), 475.
[31] Dorothy Solinger, *Chinese Business under Socialism: The Politics of Domestic Commerce in Contemporary China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 316.
[32] BJMA, 22-1-12/5.

by the business. The application process thus generated an enormous amount of information about the businesses that survived, opening up a number of possibilities for a local history of commerce in the capital of the PRC.[33]

How did the tailoring industry fare in this policy environment? The state of the industry in 1952 is described in a report issued by the Bureau of Industry and Commerce in April of that year, in the middle of the "five anti" campaign. The bureau was firmly of the opinion that Beijing had too many tailors. The report supplied basic statistics: there were currently no fewer than 2,415 tailor shops, serving a population 2, 228,900—one tailor shop for every of 923 people. Were these really needed?

> Children's clothes are rarely made by tailors, and relatively few old people have many tailor-made clothes. Ordinary clothing, moreover, [tends to be] made at home. If we calculate roughly that one in four people has clothing made by the tailor, and that each of these has three suits of clothing made a year, then each tailor shop each year will make only 692 or so sets of clothing, hardly two suits of clothing each day for each shop.[34]

From this report, which demanded cessation of any further licenses for private tailors, we get a sense of the interest in tailoring as a start-up business in the 1950s. A painfully anxious letter of application to establish a tailor shop is in fact filed with the report. The applicant was a fifty-four-year-old man surnamed Lin, self-described as without a profession. He and four companions had equipped themselves with sewing machines and proposed setting up a shop in the Sixteenth District, where there were four or five thousand households and only three tailors to meet their needs. Lin wrote that he had graduated from a sewing school, and wished now to undertake employment that would "serve the people." This letter constituted a plea to be able to participate in the economy, from someone past mid-life, and desperate, we can imagine, to find a means of keeping body and soul together.[35]

The year 1952 was a difficult time for a man to seek approval for establishing

---

[33] A major database focusing on businesses in Xidan during this period, based on just such files, has been developed in recent years by Dong Xiaoping (Department of Literature, Beijing Normal University) and Christian Lamouroux (École des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales). Among published outcomes of this project are Dong Xiaoping and Christian Lamouroux, "Xiandai shangye de shehuishi yanjiu: Beijing Chengwenhou (1942–1952)" [Beijing's Chengwenhou (1942–1952): research on modern business history], *Beijing shifan daxue xuebao (Shehui kexueban)* [Journal of Beijing Normal University (Social Sciences Edition)], no. 2 (2010), 20–31.

[34] BJMA, 22-12-01032.

[35] Ibid.

a tailor shop. As it emerged, the Bureau of Industry and Commerce wanted to stop men in particular from becoming tailors. The future of the industry, as detailed in the April report, was envisaged as one in which large tailor shops would be run as co-operatives by a number of women. (A model for this was the *Liren fengrenshe* 利人缝纫社 (Beneficial Sewing Coop) in Dongcheng district, established by the Women's Federation in 1949 for the employment of dependents of revolutionary families.)[36] For men to be cutting and stitching was a waste of their muscles. They were needed for more energetic work.[37]

The report and Lin's letter together help to identify an important means by which new tailors were entering the workforce: "sewing schools run by the Culture and Education Department" were producing graduates who were applying for licenses as private traders. Numerous schools of this type were established in the early PRC as a means of bringing women into the workforce. The present-day *Beijingshi Chongwenqu dasheng fuzhuang fengren xuexiao* 北京市崇文区大生服装缝纫学校 (Great Production School of Apparel and Tailoring in Chongwen Distict) is an example: founded in early 1949, and surviving through to the Reform Era when it was massively extended by the addition of several rural campuses.[38] In 1952, there were around twenty such schools in Beijing. They ran two or three classes simultaneously a month, churning out hundreds of machinists of whom an estimated twenty to thirty percent were skilled enough to go into business. The Bureau expressed ambivalence about such training. On the one hand, fostering women's skills in production was a good thing. On the other, "if after graduation each wants to open a tailor shop, needless to say, the [businesses] will not survive and the money will easily be wasted."

Whatever the substance of the Bureau's claims about a saturated industry, the attractions of tailoring as a profession are clear. It was a socially useful trade, one that "served the people" in the words of Mr. Lin. In addition, it was evergreen. There might well be seasons when tailors were busier than usual (demand was light in spring, heavy in autumn and winter), but there was never a time when clothes would not be needed. Further, for a skilled tailor, the pay was quite good. In Beijing, tailors were earning six hundred to eight hundred thousand a month (between sixty and eighty *yuan* in 1955 currency), and more than this if they could make Western suits.[39] Some factory jobs were paying only half that

[36] *Beijingshi Dongchengqu zhi* [Gazetteer of Dongcheng district, Beijing] (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 2004), 239.
[37] BJMA, 22-12-01032.
[38] Introduction on http://beijing.aibang.com/detail/1093196224-1495500827.Retrieved on June 13, 2010.
[39] Letter from "citizen" (*shimin* 市民) to Bureau of Industry and Commerce, 4 March 1952, in BJMA, 22-12-01032.

amount. For all these reasons, the established tailors of old Beijing found themselves in competition with a no doubt rag-tag set of competitors for their trade in the early 1950s, while at the same time trying to keep their heads above the political waters.

Surviving the "Anti" Campaigns

Due to the hothouse political environment produced by the "three anti" and "five anti" campaigns, the period from autumn 1951 to winter 1952 provides a good window for the observation of how tailors were faring in the New China. The following case studies draw on a sample group of twenty-five private entrepreneurs in tailoring and related businesses, most identified by license applications submitted in 1952. The proprietors include eight women and seventeen men (not counting business partners), of whom four were natives of Beijing (including two of the women), the remainder being from Shanxi (two), Anhui (one), Zhejiang (one), and various parts of Hebei. Of the Hebei natives, many hailed from roughly the same area two hundred miles south of Beijing. Nearly all, including two of the women, had some schooling. Three to five years of primary or private schooling was commonly mentioned in the files.

A four-year apprenticeship was standard for professional training in China, and for purposes of analysis, a distinction will be drawn here between those in the sample group who had been apprentices, and those who had not. The five tailors of the *Sanyixing xinyizhuang* 三义兴新衣庄 (Sanyixing New Clothing Store) in Qianmen district fall into the former category. Wang Yuquan 王玉泉, born around 1898 in Wuqiao 吴桥 county, Hebei, came to Beijing at the age of fifteen to serve his apprenticeship. In 1922, he established his own shop, Sanyixing, in Qianmen. In 1952, this business was reconstructed as a partnership involving himself and four other tailors. The ages (between twenty-three and thirty-four) and work histories of his partners point to the gradual expansion of this business in the decades up to 1949. Each of the partners had entered Wang's service as an apprentice during the Republican era, the eldest in 1934, and the youngest in 1945. All were from the same region of Hebei province, the eldest of them actually from the same county as Wang Yuquan, and all except one gave the shop as residential address as well as workplace.[40]

In the sample group, this was among the larger businesses, capitalized at two thousand eight hundred *yuan* (adjusted to 1955 currency).[41] By virtue of the

[40] BJMA, 22-1-13/4.

[41] Inflation had led to very large currency denominations in the early PRC. The face value of the currency was reduced in a ratio of 10,000 to 1 in March 1955. The 1955 values are used in this article for the sake of simplicity.

partnership contract, the apprentices each gained a stake of five hundred and sixty *yuan* (adjusted) in the business, equal to Wang's own stake. The size of the business and the timing of the partnership contract suggest Wang was targeted as a capitalist in the "five anti" campaign, and that the partnership reduced his political vulnerability. He remained a capitalist, but a more modest one, and shared the role now with his former employees.

The long association of each of the tailors, including Wang, with the same business; their education—a few years schooling in each case; their professional training; and their provincial origins—Hebei, not far from Being—are all factors replicated elsewhere in the sample group. These were what might be called "typical" Beijing tailors. For them, life had probably continued as normal in 1949 and thereafter, The 1951 license shows that there were four sewing machines in the shop, perhaps one for each of the four sometime apprentices; and in addition to the "manager" (Wang Yuquan) and the four "professionals," there were four "workers or shop assistants."[42] In 1952, it is very probable that all these employees were called on to criticize Wang, leading to the creation of the partnership. This must in turn have had consequences in the work place, certainly in terms of interpersonal relations and perhaps, too, in terms of the efficiency and profitability of the business.

Among licensed tailors who had not served an apprenticeship in the sample group were the founders of the Huakang Clothing Firm, established in 1951 as mentioned above. The proprietors Xie Zhenqi 谢振起 and Cao Shidong 曹世栋 were Hebei natives, from Jixian, not far from Wuqiao. The younger of them, Xie (b. ca 1929) went to school in Beijing, and it seems probable that they were both the sons of migrants who had accumulated some savings to leave their progeny. They had a substantial amount of capital: Their business had a capital value of 2,000 *yuan* (adjusted), of which 1,200 was supplied by Xie and 800 by Cao. The source of the capital in both cases is given as inherited wealth. They established their business in a good location, in Qianmen district, and they gave it an auspicious name: the China Thriving Clothing Firm. A stock inventory in their file shows some expensive items that indicate an upmarket business—or aspirations for one: ready-made winter coats and Sun Yat-sen suits, fur cut coat linings (lambskin, fox skin), and fur collars.[43]

A few things distinguish these young entrepreneurs from their fellow tailors in the sample group. First, the fact that they appear not to have served apprenticeships suggests that they are coming into the trade fresh, and perhaps relying on employees for the skilled labor in the business. They may have depended on their guarantors (before 1955, every application to trade included

[42] BJMA, 22-1-13/4.
[43] BJMA, 22-1-12/5.

two guarantors) for help in developing the foundations of their business. Both guarantors were established tailors. The wealthier of the two (still using his Beiping chop in 1951) owned the shop directly next to Huakang. Second, the declared capital investment in Huakang was at the high end of investment for tailor or clothing shops. In the sample group, the low end was 70 *yuan* (adjusted) and the middle range 200, only a tenth of the investment in Huakang. Third, the proprietors were indeed very young, only in their twenties: in the sample group, only two of the women are this young. Their youth may have been one reason why their file indicates no employment history, but it might also indicate reasons for not providing such a history, such as armed service in the Nationalist forces, or employment by the Japanese during the occupation of Beijing. Whatever the case, in 1951 they were clearly seeking to establish a means of ensuring their livelihood in the New China.

A healthy amount of capital, and a number of employees in the shop suggests the possibility of sharp class struggle during the "five anti" campaign. The file does not indicate whether Huakang was found to be law-abiding or not, and indeed the activities of the vast majority of small enterprises fell outside the realm of serious "anti" findings. Nonetheless, 1952 was a tough year for Huakang. In December of that year Xie Zhenqi applied to have the capitalization of the business reduced to from 2,000 to 400 *yuan* (adjusted). In a letter, he explained the reasons: As a newly established enterprise, business had not been too good, and during the "anti" campaigns, it had come to a complete halt. Costs in this period had been great, so that they had no choice but to lay off sales staff. The present situation was that they had few assets and only piecemeal work: the furs and quality clothing mentioned above were the last few items in their stock. It would seem that their engagement in furs ceased thereafter. In 1955, they had a license to process *zhifu*—i.e. to make the plain working clothes that among foreigners went by the name of Mao suits.[44]

For both Sanyixing and Huakang, the established tailor shop and the new, 1952 was an important turning point, marked by the restructuring of the former business and the downsizing of the latter. In the same year Li Qingpo 李庆坡 (b. ca 1892) begged to re-register his business, "Qingfeng Fuzhuang gongyehang" 庆丰服装工业行 (Qingfeng Clothing Works) under his proper name (his old business was under his alternative name Li Wenquan 李文泉), and lift its declared capital value to the tune of the cost of a sewing machine that he had failed to include in his initial license application.[45] And in 1952, Mao Pi'nian 毛丕年 was still a pewter dealer but by 1953 he had invested his capital the more

[44] Ibid.
[45] BJMA, 22-1-4/2.

serviceable area of producing knitwear.[46] A bigger database would be needed to establish how widely and in what general ways the "five anti" campaign affected individual businesses, but these adjustments suggest its immediate impact.

The other major political movement of the time, the "three anti" campaign, aimed at urban cadres, had commenced the previous autumn. The file of Wang Xianzhang (b. ca 1905), native of Beijing, suggests a certain level of sensitivity to the political climate even at this time. Wang had attended school between the age of twelve and fifteen, before serving as apprentice at Sanyuan 三源 Tailor Shop on Chang'anjie 长安街, in the heart of Beijing. Twenty years later, apparently during the Japanese occupation, he set up his own business in Chongwen district, not far east of Tiantan. He called his shop the *Wang Ji chengyiju* 王记成衣局 (Wang Ji Tailoring Establishment), and it prospered. In 1951 he had three sewing machines, and a staff of five: an apprentice, two shop assistants (of whom one was a family member), and two odd-jobbers.

In the autumn of 1951, however, something worrying Wang Xianzhang, and it was the name of his shop. From the name change he proposed, it would appear that he considered the original formulation problematic on two counts. One was the use of the word "*ju*" (translated here as "Establishment"), instead of the humble "*pu* (shop)." "*Ju*" suggested something altogether bigger and grander than perhaps was acceptable in socialist Beijing. The other was the word "*ji*," very commonly used in shop names in conjunction with the surname of the owner. Such names have a solid commercial ring about them and summon up an image of the shopkeeper himself, much like a store called "Wilson's" or indeed "Harrod's." By November 1951, Wang Xianzhang had decided he did not want to be running a shop called "Wang's Establishment," and applied to change the name to *Xinsheng chengyipu* 新生成衣铺 (New Life Tailor Shop). The reason he gave was that he felt the original name "did not suit present circumstances."[47]

A striking contrast to this last story is presented in the file of Xu Mingde 徐明德 (b. ca 1920), who as a native of Fenghua 奉化 belongs to the category of Ningbo tailor. Xu Mingde had succeeded to his father's business, the *Xu Qingji shizhuang dian* 徐庆记时装店 (Xu Qingji Fashion Store), at the age of eighteen. In 1952, Xu submitted a license application for this store, only to have the name corrected by some functionary in the Bureau of Industry and Commerce, who crossed out the words "fashion store" and inserted "tailor shop" in their stead. Apparently unfazed, Xu used the original name again when he submitted his next application, in 1955. The words were again crossed out. Perhaps in a gesture of filiality, Xu was to this date still using the store's old chop, which the functionary

[46] BJMA, 22-1-15/3. Mao appears in this file as guarantor for separate licenses in 1952 and 1953. The change of business apparently occurred between the two dates.

[47] BJMA, 22-1-7/5.

could of course not alter.[48] Clearly, there were many variables governing responses of individual tailors to the new regime.

Women Tailors

A major change in the social profile of tailoring in 1950s Beijing lay in the entry of women into the trade. In the middle of the twentieth century, the number of women in the paid labor force in China was quite low, amounting to not many more than two million in state-owned enterprises in 1953. "Most urban women," concludes Song Shaopeng, "were housewives."[49] As Song shows, the ascribed social worth of being a housewife in the New China varied in accordance with fluctuations in employment figures for the urban economy as a whole, indicating a great deal of pragmatism on gender issues. Nonetheless, the new government was in principle disposed to encourage the entry of women into the workforce. Sewing schools, much as they might be attended by men such as Mr. Lin, were a major initiative in the vocational training of women and often feature in the professional histories of women employed in tailoring in the early 1950s.

Some of the older tailoring businesses discussed here, well-capitalized and with a few employees, were obviously "shops" in the sense of having a shop front and a signboard, even if they were also the residence of the tailor and his employees, as was almost always the case. The women tailors in this sample, by contrast, were engaged in small-scale, definitively home-based work, although the word "sewing" is very likely to have been written on the wall or door of each home in question.[50] The highest level of capitalization for an individual business run by a woman in the sample group was 200 *yuan* (in 1955 currency), while the corresponding figure for men was 400 *yuan*. The one partnership involving women contrasts sharply with Sanyixing, discussed above. Liu Xuezhi (b. ca 1919), a native of Hengshui in Hebei, and a graduate of the *Dazhong fengren xuexiao* (Great Masses Sewing School), applied in 1952 for a registration of partnership involving four partners including herself. The total capitalization was 600 *yuan* (adjusted), and the partners had yet to equip themselves with a sewing machine.[51]

Not too much further can be gleaned about Liu and her partners, but they seem

[48] BJMA, 22-1-16/3.
[49] Song Shaopeng, "The State Discourse on Housework and Housewives," in *Chinese History and Society Series, Vol. 31: Rethinking China in the 1950s* ed. Mechtilde Leutner (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2007), 49.
[50] On the home as working space for Chinese women, see the discussion in "Women's Work and Ritual Space in China," in *Chinese Women Living and Working* ed. Anne Elizabeth McLaren (London: Routledge, 2004), 171.
[51] BJMA, 22-1-13/6.

to fit neatly into that category of women most readily imagined as beneficiaries of liberation under the Communist Party: uneducated housewives isolated in their homes and dependent on a male breadwinner. The same profile fits Ren Keshuang 任可双, born ca 1910, and Huang Yu 黄瑜, ten years younger, who were neighbors in the Xicheng district, and applied at the same time for trading licenses in 1954. Both had recently taken sewing lessons at a privately established vocational school.[52] Yet another such case is Li Ruilan 李瑞兰, a native of Ninghe 宁河 (near Tianjin), again a housewife with no schooling. At the age of twenty-three, around 1950, she enrolled in the Great Masses Sewing School probably for the standard three months training period. On graduation, she did not immediately go into the workforce, merely undertaking small sewing jobs for piece money—a participant in the informal economy. In April 1954, she obtained a license to establish a business. Such licenses were not readily given out at this stage, and the application is accompanied by an official report on the family's circumstances, noting their poverty: The husband was employed in a dyeing factory, and a younger cousin helped with the sewing, but there had been very little work over the past year. Her license was for specifically for processing tracksuits.[53]

Another two women in the sample are a reminder that women's education and participation in the paid workforce did not date from 1949. Wang Peizhen 王佩珍, born around the time of the 1911 Revolution, had six years schooling, and was married at the age of 18. While managing the household, she supplemented the family income by making hats and underpants. She had enough resources either then or later to invest in a sewing machine. In 1952, she applied for registration as a privately-owned business licensed to sew and produce hats and underwear, but was limited to the production of hats as her main business concern, with underwear as a sideline. In 1954, she applied for a change in her line of business on the grounds that with the passing of winter, no one needed hats and she could not make a living.[54] The late date of her initial application for a trading license in 1952 may have been due to her continuing to work informally in the early years of the PRC, perhaps until the mass campaigns of 1952. The change in the nature of her business in 1954 suggests a decreasing demand for socialist-style hats as the initial need was satisfied. Hats were a growth industry in early 1950s Beijing,[55] but one hat could serve its wearer for a long time.

Like Wang Peizhen, Wang Xiurong 王秀荣 was the beneficiary of the

[52] BJMA, 22-1-6/4-5.
[53] BJMA, 22-1-12/6.
[54] BJMA, 22-1-7/4.
[55] *Beijingshi Xichengqu zhi* [Gazetteer of Xicheng district, Beijing] (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1999), 588.

education system that was in place before 1949. This young woman may have suffered downward social mobility. She had had five years schooling, and her family may have owned a sewing machine before 1949, for in that year already she was able to obtain skilled work as a machine operator in a clothing factory, a position she held until 1951. From there she moved to employment in the *Dasheng fuzhuangdian* 大生服装店 (Great Production Clothing Store) in the Xicheng district. This change of employment could have been for any number of reasons, but undoubtedly the work of a shop assistant was lighter than factory work, and easier for a young woman who may have had more than one pregnancy in the early 1950s. Small children posed the problem of childcare for working parents, and in 1954, a time before childcare centers were widely available, this couple had three children. A note in the application describes the family's reduced circumstances: the husband earned only thirty *yuan* a month. Wang Xiurong's stated capital for starting up this business was 200 *yuan* (adjusted), the full value of the sewing machine. Her license was for the processing of z*hifu*—the standard jacket and trouser ensembles that came to be referred to as the Mao suit in the western press.[56]

Despite their different beginnings, all the women in the sample ended up in roughly the same place in the occupational structure of 1950s Beijing, an outcome that points to the constraints or "restrictions" on private enterprise as much as to the vocational opportunities offered to women by sewing schools. The lives of all of them indicate increased interaction with the state. The effect is particularly clear in the case of Wang Peizhen, who was earning money from handicraft skills well before the Communist Revolution, and was brought out of the private sphere by the revolutionary and bureaucratic process. However, being "brought out" did not necessarily take women out of the home. Wang Xiurong, for one, must have had one foot on the treadle and another on the cradle.

At the same time, it is worth noting that early collective economic enterprises in the apparel sector probably involved proportionally large numbers of women. These began to emerge well before the implementation of socialist transformation. An example is the Beneficial Sewing Cooperative in Dongcheng district, mentioned above, which began with three women and nine sewing machines in the summer of 1949, and had grown to 108 women and 90 sewing machines by February the following year.[57] In Xicheng district, a *junshu shengchanzu* 军属生产组 (production group for Army wives) was set up in 1951, and was substantially given over to sewing.[58] Considering these developments alongside evidence of individual women tailors coming out of the sewing schools,

[56] BJMA, 22-1-14/6.
[57] *Beijingshi Dongchengqu zhi*, 239.
[58] *Beijingshi Xichengqu zhi*, 587.

it would seem that the changing gender structure of the tailoring sector in Beijing was associated with the sector's de-professionalization. That is, the production of clothing for the market was increasingly undertaken by people (especially women) who had not served an apprenticeship.

In general, women in the sector were also much less likely to be employers, and thus less likely to have been directly affected by the "five anti" campaign. In fact, three of the women applying for licenses as private traders in this sample group did so only in 1954. If the files of the male tailors point to 1951–52, or more precisely the period of the "anti" campaigns, as a turning point in business history, the evidence collected on women in the industry is much more patchy. As in other areas of history, the historical time line for this decade may well need to be bifurcated to take such differences into account.

Conclusion

With the socialist transformation of industry and commerce in 1956, all the little *pu* (shops) and *hang* (firms) and *zhuang* (businesses) in the textile and apparel sector in Beijing were transformed into *she* (co-ops). In Dongcheng district, twelve hundred "small tailors and individual sewing businesses" were collapsed into around a dozen co-ops; in Xicheng a somewhat smaller number into eight.[59] Co-ops each had one hundred members, and since each retained his or her own equipment and was paid piece rates, it sounds as though the transformation did not initially make difference to how small tailors functioned in the city. However, they did not flourish. In Chongwen district in 1958, there were twenty-one clothing production co-ops with more than three thousand workers. In 1959, the second year of the Great Leap Forward, this number shrank to five co-ops with 1,301 workers.[60] The Beijing tailor had become a disappearing species.

The dramatic political developments in the second half of the decade should not be allowed to obscure the changes in the preceding five years. During the early 1950s, tailors gradually ceased to wait for a client to arrive with a length of cloth that they would then cut and make up as the customer desired. Increasingly they operated within a state-run industrial-commercial network, purchasing cloth from state-owned wholesalers, and processing fixed categories of garments. Their capacity to work outside this network was limited. Wang Peizhen, for example, must have been in some economic distress in the winter of 1954 but unable to help herself by diversifying her output because of the restrictions on what she could make. Ai Jianhou 艾建侯 (b. ca 1908), native of Pinggu 平谷 in

[59] *Beijingshi Dongchengqu zhi*, 590; *Beijingshi Xichengqu zhi*, 587.
[60] *Beijingshi Chongwenqu zhi*, 555.

Hebei, was licensed in 1955 to take over his son's tailor shop, but a business that had in 1952 had been producing adults and children's clothing was in 1955 confined to producing face masks.[61] Xu Mingde thought of himself as *chengyi shougong* 成衣手工 ("making clothes by hand"), but the Bureau of Industry and Commerce decided he was simply "processing suits [of work clothes]."[62]

Chinese publications then and now often feature pictures of young women of the 1950s wearing *bulaji*—a Russian-influenced frocks, were known,[63] in keeping with a tendency to imagine this decade as "the golden age"—before the disaster of the Great Leap Forward and the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. It is true that there was a greater diversity of dress in the 1950s than during the Cultural Revolution, but the difference between the periods in terms of sobriety and uniformity of dress is not great. Archival materials used for this article show that ordinary tailor shops were producing very ordinary clothes, work clothes for the most part, along with knitwear items such as tracksuits and underwear, and—in a reminder of the ongoing Korean War—military uniforms. There were still some stores specializing in Western suits, but these may have been mainly for foreigners living in Beijing, particularly Russians and East Europeans. As noted earlier in this article, I have elsewhere argued that the ubiquity of the cadre suit, the Lenin suit, and other forms of distinctively Chinese socialist dress was grounded in the popularity of these styles in the New China era. But when we look at what tailor shops were licensed to produced, we can see that the supply of clothing in the early 1950s must have been a factor. Although there were no laws controlling what people wore, the command economy did lead to restrictions in clothing as in other aspects of daily life.

The shrinking range of products that tailors were licensed to produce shows a narrowing of choices in entrepreneurial activity. Already in 1949, merchants accustomed to dealing in luxury goods were turning, as Derk Bodde observed, to selling everyday necessities.[64] Men and women who may have had comfortable positions in the old regime found themselves out of work in the New China and turned to practical and dependable trades. In practicing these trades, they operated within narrow regulatory confines and under increasing political pressure. The Beijing Bureau of Industry and Commerce archives suggest that for established tailoring concerns, the "five anti" campaign made 1952 a difficult year, which is consistent with the experience of private enterprise more generally.[65] The bureau's report of that year anticipated the socialist

[61] BJMA, 22-1-6/3.
[62] BJMA, 22-1-16/3.
[63] See Finnane, *Changing Clothes in China*, 210–1.
[64] Derk Bodde, *Peking Diary: A Year of Revolution* (New York: Schuman, 1950), 139.
[65] So, "The Policy-Making and Political Economy of Private Ownership in the Early 1950s," 695–6.

transformation of tailoring businesses when it articulated its vision of a clothing production industry comprised of co-operatives. Probably from that year, the horizons of possibility in the clothing production sector were visibly shrinking. Probably from that year, tailors all over Beijing were asking themselves: "What can I call my business? What can I make in my business?" at least as long as they had a business to call their own.

Chinese-Language Bibliography

《北京市崇文区志》，北京：北京出版社，2004 年。
《北京市东城区志》，北京：北京出版社，2004 年。
《北京市西城区志》，北京：北京出版社，1999 年。
Dong Xiaoping and Christian Lamouroux 董晓萍、蓝克利，《现代商业的社会史研究：北京成文厚（1942–1952）》，《北京师范大学学报（社会科学版）》，2010 年，2 期，20–31 页。
Lin Shujian and Lin Min 林树建、林旻，《宁波商帮》，香港：中华书局, 1995 年。
Liu Yunhua 刘云华，《宁波本帮裁缝向红帮转型的行业基础的研究》，《浙江纺织服装职业技术学院学报》，2009 年 3 月，1 期，60–1 页。
Jia Xiumei 贾秀梅，《论"五反"运动对中国民族资产阶级的影响及启示——兼论对新民主主义制度的影响》，《北京行政学院学报》，2008 年，5 期，106–9 页。
Suo Yuanzhong and Liu Yuanbo 索元仲、刘源波，《北京"八大祥"之首瑞蚨祥绸布店率先合营》， Beijingjuan bianjizu 北京卷编辑组编，《中国资本主义工商业的社会主义改造：北京卷》，北京：中共党史出版社，1991 年。
Wang Yongbin 王永斌，《北京的商业街和老字号》，北京：北京燕山出版社，1999 年。
Wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui 文史资料委员会编，《王府井》，北京：北京出版社，1993 年。
Xin Guancha banyuekan《新观察半月刊》，1955 年 4 月 16 日。
Yang Jingya 杨静雅，《80 年前宁波西服店京城顶呱呱》，《宁波晚报》，2004 年 3 月 22 日。
Zhang Hao 张浩，《建国初期中国共产党的私人资本主义政策——以北京市为个案》，《经济观察：企业导报》，2009 年，7 期，7–10 页。
Zuixin Beiping zhinan《最新北平指南》，Zhang Jianming and Qi Dazhi 张建明、齐大之，《话说京商》，北京：中华工商联合出版社，2006 年。